Media authentication is important in content delivery via untrusted intermediaries, such as peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing. Many differently encoded versions of a media file might exist. Our previous work applied distributed source coding not only to distinguish the legitimate diversity of encoded images from tampering but also localize the tampered regions in an image already deemed to be inauthentic. An authentication decoder was supplied with a Slepian-Wolf encoded image projection as authentication data.
INTRODUCTION
Media authentication is important in content delivery via untrusted intermediaries, such as peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing or P2P multicast streaming. In these applications, many differently encoded versions of the original file might exist. Moreover, transcoding and bitstream truncation at intermediate nodes might give rise to further diversity. But intermediaries might also tamper with the media for many reasons, such as interfering with the distribution of a particular file, piggybacking unauthentic content, or generally discrediting a distribution system. In previous work, we applied distributed source coding (DSC) to image authentication to distinguish the diversity of legitimate encodings from malicious manipulation [1] and demonstrated that the same framework can localize tampering in images deemed to be inauthentic [2, 3] . In this paper, we extend our image authentication scheme to be robust to legitimate changes in contrast and brightness that may arise, for example, from transcoding. Our approach is to let the authentication decoder learn contrast and brightness parameters using an Expectation Maximization (EM) [4] algorithm.
Past media authentication approaches fall into two groups: watermarks and media hashes. A "fragile" watermark can be embedded into the host signal waveform without perceptual distortion [5, 6] . Users can confirm the authenticity by extracting the watermark from This work has been supported, in part, by a gift from NXP Semiconductors to the Stanford Center for Integrated Systems and, in part, by the Max Planck Center for Visual Computing and Communication. the received content. The watermark should survive lossy compression, but should "break" as a result of a malicious manipulation. Unfortunately, watermarking authentication is not backward compatible with previously encoded contents; unmarked contents cannot be authenticated later. Embedded watermarks might also increase the bit-rate required when compressing a media file.
Media hashing [7, 8] achieves authentication of previously encoded media by using an authentication server to supply authentication data to the user. Media hashes are inspired by cryptographic digital signatures [9] , but unlike cryptographic hash functions, media hash functions offer proof of perceptual integrity. Using a cryptographic hash, a single bit difference leads to an entirely different hash value. If two media signals are perceptually indistinguishable, they should have identical hash values. A common approach of media hashing is extracting features which have perceptual importance and should survive compression. The authentication data are generated by compressing the features or generating their hash values. The user checks the authenticity of the received content by comparing the features or their hash values to the authentication data.
Section 2 reviews our image authentication system using distributed source codes [1] , an extension of media hashing. It has similarities with secure biometric authentication [10, 11] and the semifragile watermarking scheme in [12] . In Section 3, we describe a model for contrast and brightness adjustment and introduce our extension for image authentication with parameter learning. The EM algorithmic details are given in Section 4. Simulation results in Section 5 show that the proposed scheme can distinguish between authentic encodings of contrast and brightness adjusted images and illegitimately modified versions. Fig. 1 is the block diagram for the image authentication scheme of [1] as well as the current work. We denote the source image as x. We model the image-to-be-authenticated y by way of the spacevarying two-state lossy channel in Fig. 2 . The legitimate state of the channel performs lossy JPEG2000 or JPEG compression and reconstruction with peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) of 32 dB or better. The illegitimate state additionally includes malicious tampering. The channel state variable Si is defined per nonoverlapping 16x16 block of image y. If any pixel in block Bi is tampered, Si = 1; otherwise, Si = 0.
REVIEW OF IMAGE AUTHENTICATION WITH DSC
We now review the authentication system. The left-hand side of Fig. 1 shows that a pseudorandom projection (based on a randomly drawn seed Ks) is applied to the original image x to produce projection coefficients X, which are quantized to Xq. The authentication data comprise two parts, both derived from Xq. The Slepian- Wolf bitstream S(Xq) is the output of a Slepian-Wolf encoder based on rate-adaptive low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes [13] . The much smaller digital signature D(Xq, Ks) consists of the seed Ks and a cryptographic hash value of Xq signed with a private key. The authentication data are generated by a server upon request. Each response uses a different random seed Ks, which is provided to the decoder as part of the authentication data. This prevents an attack which simply confines the tampering to the nullspace of the projection. Based on the random seed, for each 16x16 nonoverlapping block Bi, we generate a 16x16 pseudorandom matrix Pi by drawing its elements independently from a Gaussian distribution N (1, σ 2 ) and normalizing so that ||Pi||2 = 1. We choose σ = 0.2 empirically. The inner product Bi, Pi is an element of X, quantized to an element of Xq.
The authentication decoder, in the right-hand side of Fig. 1 , seeks to authenticate the image y with authentication data S(Xq) and D(Xq, Ks). It first projects y to Y in the same way as during authentication data generation. A Slepian-Wolf decoder reconstructs Xq from the Slepian-Wolf bitstream S(Xq) using Y as side information. Decoding is via joint bitplane LDPC belief propagation [14] initialized according to the known statistics of the legitimate channel state at the worst permissible quality for the given original image. Then the image digest of Xq is computed and compared to the image digest, decrypted from the digital signature D(Xq, Ks) using a public key. If these two image digests are not identical, the receiver declares image y to be inauthentic. If they match, then Xq has been recovered. To confirm the authenticity of y, the receiver verifies that the empirical conditional entropy Hemp(Xq|Y ) (based on the legitimate channel model) is less than a certain threshold. Image-to-beauthenticated y
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Affine Contrast and Brightness Adjustment Fig. 3 . Space-varying two-state lossy channel with affine contrast and brightness adjustment.
Since this second-pass comparison uses all available information, the threshold for Hemp(Xq|Y ) specifies how statistically similar the image-to-be-authenticated must be to the original to be declared authentic. But the rate of the Slepian-Wolf bitstream S(Xq) determines whether the quantized image projection Xq is recovered at all [15] . Accordingly, at the encoder, we select a Slepian-Wolf bitrate just sufficient to successfully decode with both legitimate 32 dB JPEG2000 and JPEG reconstructed versions of x. At the decoder, we choose a threshold for Hemp(Xq|Y ) for the second-pass comparison to distinguish between the different joint statistics induced in the images by the legitimate and illegitimate channel states.
CONTRAST AND BRIGHTNESS MODEL
In this paper, we replace the two-state lossy channel in Fig. 2 with the one in Fig. 3 . Now both the legitimate and illegitimate states of the channel are affected by a global affine contrast and brightness adjustment. In the legitimate state, we model y = ax + b + z, where a and b are the contrast and brightness parameters, respectively, and z is noise introduced by compression and reconstruction. Fig. 4 demonstrates the channel for a source image "Lena" at 8-bit 512x512 resolution. In the legitimate state, the channel output is first contrast and brightness adjusted with a = 1.2 and b = 10, and then JPEG2000 compressed and reconstructed at 32 dB PSNR. In the illegitimate state, a text banner is additionally overlaid on the reconstructed image.
The image authentication system described in Section 2 cannot authenticate legitimate images subject to the contrast and brightness adjustment just described. This is because the affine relationship is preserved by the random image projection due to its linearity; that is, Y = aX + b + Z. Consequently, even legitimate Y is poor side information for the decoding of X. An apparent workaround is to choose nonlinear projections insensitive to global contrast and brightness changes. But this would leave the system vulnerable to malicious local tampering in contrast and/or brightness, since the projections are applied blockwise. Another approach is to communicate statistics about the original image x (such as overall pixel mean and variance) to the authentication decoder via the digitally signed channel. The decoder could estimate the parameters a and b and correct the side information Y . Estimation of a and b would be reliable for a legitimate image-to-beauthenticated y, but could be misled by tampering since the transmitted statistics would no longer be sufficient. While this is acceptable for authentication, it can not be extended to tampering localization in illegitimate images.
Therefore, we instead propose that the authentication decoder learn the global contrast and brightness parameters directly from the Slepian-Wolf bitstream S(Xq) and the side information Y using an EM algorithm. This type of combination of unsupervised learning with distributed source decoding was pioneered in [16, 14] .
EXPECTATION MAXIMIZATION
The introduction of learning to the system in Fig. 1 only requires a modification of the Slepian-Wolf decoder block from a joint-bitplane LDPC decoder [14] to the contrast-and-brightness-learning SlepianWolf decoder shown in Fig. 5 . As before, it takes the Slepian-Wolf bitstream S(Xq) and the side information Y and yields the reconstructed image projection Xq . But it now does this via an EM algorithm that updates the a posteriori probability mass function (pmf) Papp(Xq) in the E-step and updates a and b by maximum likelihood estimation in the M-step. In the E-step, we fix contrast a and brightness b at their current estimates. Next we apply contrast and brightness adjustment with these values to obtain intrinsic pmfs of the image projection pixels [Xq]i from the side information pixels Yi. Finally, we run one iteration of joint bitplane LDPC decoding on the intrinsic pmfs with the Slepian-Wolf bitstream S(Xq) to produce extrinsic pmfs Papp([Xq]i = xq), which we denote Q i (xq) for convenience. In the M-step, we fix these extrinsic pmfs Q i (xq) of the pixels [Xq]i and estimate of a and b with reference to the side information pixels Yi. For robustness, we only consider pixels, for which maxx q Q i (xq) > T = 0.9995, denoting the set of eligible indices as C. (To guarantee that C is nonempty, we make sure to encode a small portion of the quantized image projection Xq with degree-1 syndrome bits. The decoder knows those values with probability 1 and includes their indices in C.) We now derive optimality conditions on the parameters a and b for the maximization of a lower bound L(a, b) of the log-likelihood function L(a, b) . The lower bound is due to Jensen's inequality and the concavity of log(.):
where the distribution P (xq|Yi; a, b) is a quantized Gaussian with mean at (Yi − b)/a and variance σ 2 z /a 2 . Setting partial derivatives ofL(a, b) with respect to a and b to zero, we obtain the optimality conditions: 
SIMULATION RESULTS
Our first experiment uses "Lena" of size 512x512 at 8-bit gray resolution. The two-state channel in Fig. 3 varies contrast and brightness Fig. 6 compares the minimum rate (averaged over 20 trials) for decoding S(Xq) with legitimate and illegitimate side information using three different decoding schemes: the proposed EM decoder that learns a and b, an oracle decoder that knows a and b, and a fixed decoder that always uses a = 1 and b = 0. The EM decoder separates the minimum rates as effectively as the oracle decoder, while the fixed decoder cannot always decode at low rate with legitimate side information.
We set the authentication data size to 107 bytes and measure false acceptance and rejection rates. The channel settings remain the same except that a and b are drawn uniformly at random from [0.8, 1.2] and [−20, 20], respectively, and JPEG2000/JPEG reconstruction PSNR selected from 32-42 dB. With 6000 trials each on "Barbara", "Lena", "Mandrill", and "Peppers", false acceptance rate is for all decoders; that is, no illegitimate image is deemed authentic. The false rejection rate is zero for the oracle decoder and only 1 out of 24000 for the EM decoder, but about 95% for the fixed decoder. In the legitimate case, EM estimates a and b with mean squared error 6.2 × 10 −5 and 0.9, respectively.
CONCLUSIONS
We have extended our image authentication system to handle contrast and brightness adjusted images. Our authentication decoder learns the contrast and brightness parameters via an unsupervised EM algorithm. We demonstrate that an authentication Slepian-Wolf bitstream of 107 bytes is sufficient to distinguish between legitimate encodings of contrast and brightness adjusted images and illegitimately modified versions. The work can be extended to other manipulations with an appropriate M-Step.
